linux-imx

ext4: add basic fs-verity support

Add most of fs-verity support to ext4.  fs-verity is a filesystem
feature that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication
of read-only files.  It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file
level: a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in
log(filesize) time.  It is implemented mainly by helper functions in
fs/verity/.  See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the full
documentation.

This commit adds all of ext4 fs-verity support except for the actual
data verification, including:

- Adding a filesystem feature flag and an inode flag for fs-verity.

- Implementing the fsverity_operations to support enabling verity on an
  inode and reading/writing the verity metadata.

- Updating ->write_begin(), ->write_end(), and ->writepages() to support
  writing verity metadata pages.

- Calling the fs-verity hooks for ->open(), ->setattr(), and ->ioctl().

ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor)
past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond
i_size.  This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and
(b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be
read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small changes
to ext4.  This approach avoids having to depend on the EA_INODE feature
and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to support paging
multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support encrypting xattrs.
Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is,
since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.

This patch incorporates work by Theodore Ts'o and Chandan Rajendra.

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>