Commits
David Windsor committed 8d2704d382a
jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache The jfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct jfs_inode_info.i_inline and therefore contained in the jfs_ip slab cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/jfs/super.c: jfs_alloc_inode(...): ... jfs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(jfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS); ... return &jfs_inode->vfs_inode; fs/jfs/jfs_incore.h: JFS_IP(struct inode *inode): return container_of(inode, struct jfs_inode_info, vfs_inode); fs/jfs/inode.c: jfs_iget(...): ... inode->i_link = JFS_IP(inode)->i_inline; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the jfs_ip slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@kernel.org> Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>