Commits
Kees Cook committed 9196436ab2f
vsprintf: ignore %n again This ignores %n in printf again, as was originally documented. Implementing %n poses a greater security risk than utility, so it should stay ignored. To help anyone attempting to use %n, a warning will be emitted if it is encountered. Based on an earlier patch by Joe Perches. Because %n was designed to write to pointers on the stack, it has been frequently used as an attack vector when bugs are found that leak user-controlled strings into functions that ultimately process format strings. While this class of bug can still be turned into an information leak, removing %n eliminates the common method of elevating such a bug into an arbitrary kernel memory writing primitive, significantly reducing the danger of this class of bug. For seq_file users that need to know the length of a written string for padding, please see seq_setwidth() and seq_pad() instead. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>