linux-imx

binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE

The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders
away from ET_EXEC binaries.  (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2
/bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the
loader had been loaded.)

With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header),
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking
at ET_DYN.  However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the
top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space
is unused.

For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are
loaded above the mmap region.  This means they can be made to collide
(CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with
pathological stack regions.

Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap
region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling
back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e.
if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load
instead of falling back to the mmap region).

To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP)
are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an
ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by
the loader.  Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk
of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.

For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use
the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.

Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and
suggestions on how to implement this solution.

Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>